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Abstract 
 
This paper tries to determine to what extent EU-US cooperation in the field of 
international peace and security is impacted by bilateral relations under the New 
Transatlantic Agenda versus multilateral dialogues. It employs Michael Smith's 
framework of 'bi-multilateral' negotiations in its analysis. The case studies explored are 
bilateral dialogues under the New Transatlantic Agenda alongside multilateral 
dialogues in the framework of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation and ad hoc fora such as the Middle East Quartet. The main finding is 
that bilateral and multilateral dialogues are complementary in EU-US cooperation on 
issues of international peace and security. Bilateral dialogues by themselves are not 
sufficient to effectively address complex international peace and security issues. 
Multilateral dialogues can gain useful support, efficiency and a degree of legitimacy 
from good relations at the bilateral level. Moreover, ad hoc fora can be valuable 
additions which may complement both existing bilateral as well as multilateral EU-US 
dialogues. Finally, the choice of forum and the potential of EU-US cooperation are 
often considerably influenced by the nature of the issue under discussion. 
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Introduction: Bi- or Multilateralism in Transatlantic Cooperation 
 
Today's world is filled with contradictions. On the one hand, it is characterised by a 
proliferation of complex problems: failed states, asymmetric conflict, climate 
change, nuclear weapons and interference in sovereign states' affairs. On the other 
hand, there is a wider-than-ever range of instruments with which to tackle these 
problems: a revamped United Nations (UN) thanks to the end of Cold War bipolar 
animosities, willing and able regional organisations such as the European Union (EU), 
and the information and science revolutions. On the one hand, the realisation that 
global problems must be addressed through concerted international efforts has 
gained in unprecedented strength. On the other hand, traditional state actors such 
as the United States of America (US) or Russia have not shied away from emphasising 
their sovereign 'right' to deal with threats to their own states and have employed 
unilateral measures to the great moral discomfort of many. On the one hand, many 
different frameworks through which to address global issues – and which have 
proven to be effective individually – do exist, such as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) aimed at tackling global poverty. On the other hand, they lack 
in coordination and coherence and have, in absolute terms, often failed to achieve 
any significant or long-lasting results. 
 
It is fair to argue that the EU and the US possess, to a significant extent, both the 
means and the willingness to tackle many of the global problems. Indeed, a unified 
and coherent coalition of both would be a powerful, if not formidable, force which 
could make a huge leap towards addressing issues such as climate change, 
international security and poverty. As President Bush has suggested, "when Europe 
and the US are united, no problem and no enemy can stand against us".1 Of course, 
there are many valid reasons why this is frequently not the case; after all both are 
pragmatic actors who predictably would rank labouring for their own interests above 
rigid collaboration. In the face of the many pressing international problems, the 
transatlantic and global debates are repeatedly focused on effectiveness and 
efficiency. Questions about UN reform, about maximising the potential of the 
European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) bearing in mind EU member 
disunity, as well as questions about which partners should be engaged and 
regarding which issues continue to abound. Despite such discussions, global 
problems are still often tackled on an ad hoc basis, as the only truly universal 
organisation, the UN, frequently remains paralysed by inefficiency, lack of resources 
and power struggles. 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the 
United States, An Independent Study Commissioned by the Commission of the European 
Communities, Final Report, Tender OJ 2004/S 83-070340, p. 8. 
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For that reason it is particularly interesting, and indeed beneficial, to study the 
existent frameworks for cooperation which two of the world's most powerful actors, 
the EU and the US, have at their disposal. Which fora could render the outcomes of 
transatlantic engagement the most productive? In which format do the EU and US 
cooperate most willingly? Under what conditions, for example, would bilateral 
interaction between the two be more effective than multilateral discussions?  
 
This paper approaches such questions through the analytical framework of 'bi-
multilateralism' as developed by Michael Smith.2 'Bi-multilateralism' is defined as the 
"coexistence of occasions [to negotiate] both at the bilateral and at the multilateral 
level".3 At least regarding the economic aspects of EU-US relations, Smith concludes 
that it is more useful to approach EU-US relations through this theoretical framework 
instead of almost artificially separating the two levels into the multilateral and the 
bilateral.4 Using case studies, such as the Doha Development Round, Smith finds the 
element of "co-dependency" among the two levels consistently present, suggesting 
that "it is a systematic or organic part of the negotiation process".5 This paper picks 
up where Smith stopped and tries to apply his theory of bi-multilateralism to EU-US 
relations in the field of international peace and security negotiations rather than 
economic relations. 
 
The main objective of this paper is to determine how the EU-US relations under the 
New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) compare and correspond to EU-US relations in 
multilateral fora, in particular to what extent EU-US cooperation in the field of 
international peace and security is impacted by bilateral versus multilateral 
dialogues. The preliminary hypothesis based on Smith's approach is that bilateral and 
multilateral dialogues are complementary in EU-US cooperation in the field of 
international peace and security and that both are necessary for effective 
cooperation. However, they seem to exist in a parallel rather than interwoven fashion 
and are thus also capable of running separately. 
 
The New Transatlantic Agenda serves as a document which explicitly sets out the 
most important areas of cooperation between the EU and the US. It was signed at 
the EU-US Summit in Madrid on the 3 December 19956 and followed the signing of 
the Transatlantic Declaration (TD) in November 1990 between the European 
                                                 
2 M. Smith, "The European Union and the United States of America: The Politics of 'Bi-
multilateral' Negotiations," in O. Elgström & C. Jönsson (eds.), European Union Negotiations: 
Processes, Networks and Institutions, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 171. 
3 Ibid., pp. 171-172. 
4 Ibid., p. 179. 
5 Ibid., p. 180. 
6 Commission of the European Communities, The New Transatlantic Agenda, 3 December 
1995, p. 1. 
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Community (EC) and the US.7 The NTA was both a step towards a further formal 
bilateral dialogue and institutionalization of EU-US relations,8 and a broad blueprint of 
common goals and common channels of cooperation for the future. It was 
accompanied by a Joint Action Plan (JAP) which outlined specific priorities for 
transatlantic cooperation.9 This was particularly important in the face of the 
disappearance of the Cold War bipolarities and the common enemy, namely the 
Soviet Union, which had arguably acted as the 'glue' that kept the two sides 
gether.10 
they represent influential fora in which the 
ansatlantic allies have a strong voice. 
                                                
to
 
The focus of this paper is the first NTA goal – "promoting peace and stability, 
democracy and development around the world"11 – and in particular EU-US 
cooperation in the realm of international peace and security. Since the issue areas 
which fall under the first NTA goal are very wide-ranging and complex, three 
particular examples were chosen with which to analyse the case studies, namely the 
Iraq War in 2003, the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) and the war in Kosovo in 
1999 and its aftermath. The specific fora which are looked at as cases of bilateral 
cooperation are dialogues under the NTA. The multilateral dialogues are exemplified 
by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA), the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), and ad hoc fora, such as the Middle East Quartet. These 
are the primary frameworks through which the EU and the US approach issues of 
international peace and security and 
tr
 
The analysis of EU-US cooperation is based on an evaluation of four explanatory 
variables.12 Firstly, the power of the EU versus the US and the extent to which it can 
encourage or hinder cooperation are considered in each forum. The second 
variable is the convergence, or lack thereof, of the interests and values of the 
transatlantic allies. In the war in Kosovo in 1999, for instance, the convergence was 
evident, whereas it was highly disputed and almost non-existent in the run up to the 
 
7 Commission of the European Communities, Transatlantic Declaration on EC-US Relations, 22 
November 1990, p. 1. 
8 R. Steffenson, Managing EU-US Relations: Actors, Institutions and the New Transatlantic 
Agenda, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2005, p. 25. 
9 Ibid., p. 37. 
10 A. Gardner, "From the Transatlantic Declaration to the New Transatlantic Agenda: The 
Shaping of Institutional Mechanisms and Policy Objectives by National and Supranational 
Actors", in E. Philippart & P. Winand (eds.), Ever Closer Partnership: Policy-Making in US-EU 
Relations, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2001, pp. 96-97. 
11 Ibid. 
12 A longer qualitative evaluation of the importance and significance of each variable is 
available elsewhere; due to the short nature of this paper, only the most noteworthy findings 
are highlighted and discussed. See S. Lipstaite, The Impact of Bilateral versus Multilateral 
Dialogues on EU-US Cooperation in the Field of International Peace and Security, Master's 
thesis, Bruges, College of Europe, 2009. 
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Iraq War. Thirdly, the unity of the EU is considered, meaning the ability of the EU to 
present a unified and coherent position in a forum, backed by all of its member 
states. Finally, the changes in US administration since 1995 are evaluated as a 
otentially significant factor.  
ilateral Dialogues: New Transatlantic Agenda 
 added value of the 
TA. How do the four variables play out in the bilateral setting? 
p
 
B
 
Bilateral dialogues under the NTA take place at several levels. The most visible level is 
the annual summit between the US President on the one hand and the EU 
Presidency and the Commission President on the other.13 Secondly, ministerial-level 
meetings between the EU troika and the US Secretary of State take place at least 
once per EU Presidency, and although they are not technically part of the NTA, they 
nevertheless constitute an important channel for communication and they influence 
the agenda of lower-level working groups.14 These are the Senior Level Group, the 
NTA Task Force and the Political Directors meetings, alongside several 'expert' or 
working group meetings per year.15 Although political decisions are, naturally, taken 
at the top level, the continuous exchange of information and efforts towards 
cooperation at all levels constitute the main advantages and
N
 
(1) Power Balance 
 
As the Commission has argued, a "partnership of equals" has not been achieved 
because of the different institutional structures and administrative practices in the EU 
and US systems and the lack of political cohesion in the EU.16 For instance, the EU in 
the NTA summits possesses a much narrower scope for bargaining than does the US 
President due to the intricate pre-summit deliberations at EU level in Brussels.17 
Furthermore, "the American tendency to see relations with Europe through the prism 
                                                 
13 T. Frellesen, "Processes and Procedures in EU-US Foreign Policy Cooperation: From the 
oser Partnership: Policy-Making in US-EU Relations, Brussels, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 
forcing the Transatlantic Relationship: Focusing on Strategy and Delivering 
Transatlantic Declaration to the New Transatlantic Agenda", in E. Philippart & P. Winand 
(eds.),  Ever Cl
2001, p. 322. 
14 Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States, 
op.cit.., p. 38. 
15 Frellesen, op.cit. 
16 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council,  Rein
Results, COM(2001) 154 final, Brussels, 20 March 2001, p. 7. 
17 Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States, 
op.cit., p. 37. 
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of NATO/security, rather than in EU-US terms" has also proven to be a hindrance to 
transatlantic cooperation.18 
On the other hand, the NTA framework often acts as a helpful forum in which the two 
sides can pursue dialogues, in principle, as equals who are interested in sharing their 
concerns and eliciting support from their chief partners; this is particularly the case 
between leaders at the highest level. As an official at the Commission argues, the 
annual EU-US summits are solemn events which, nevertheless, do possess an intimate 
and personal quality and an open and flexible nature.19 Their substantial agenda 
an produce efficient outcomes because they often facilitate and clean up the 
n practice, meet as equals, the outcomes tend to 
present the preferences of one side more than the other, although this seems to 
demonstrated by the arguable 'success stories' in 
ansatlantic relations, for example, "the effective co-ordination of policy and action 
c
agenda of multilateral cooperation.20 
 
As another Commission official argues, the less controversial issues are largely agreed 
upon, or at least discussed, unless one of the sides has an exceptionally strong 
objection to a particular item being placed on the agenda.21 On the more 
controversial issues, such as Iraq, painful divergences between the EU and the US are 
tolerated, even if this means that the summit conclusions are often watered down to 
an extent that they do not fundamentally contradict the position of either partner.22 
The issue of power, then, is a rather changeable variable under the NTA regarding 
international peace and security negotiations: even though the two partners in 
theory, though not wholly i
re
happen more or less in turns. 
 
(2) Convergence of Interests 
 
The central proposition of this subsection is that if there is a convergence of interests 
regarding a specific issue area in the bilateral dialogues, the EU and the US are more 
willing to cooperate and are more effective in achieving constructive outcomes. 
Such a tendency could be 
tr
in the Western Balkans".23  
 
                                                 
18 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council,  Reinforcing the Transatlantic Relationship: Focusing on Strategy and Delivering 
Results, op.cit. 
19 Interview with an official (c), DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 17 February 2009. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Interview with an official (a), DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 17 February 2009. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council;  Reinforcing the Transatlantic Relationship: Focusing on Strategy and Delivering 
Results, op.cit. 
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Indeed, the two transatlantic allies have acted through bilateral fora with a high 
degree of success. Issues important to both partners, such as Kosovo, are always on 
the agenda of EU-US summits. The two sides have post-1999 indeed succeeded in 
preventing further wars on European soil, in achieving a significant level of 
institutional and economic reconstruction in the area, and in engaging the Balkan 
ountries in political programmes, for instance, by enticing several of them with the 
ince their very 
ception.24 Due to several different factors, such as greater US capability and 
les, it is fair to conclude that, firstly, the convergence of 
U and US interests can indeed make a great difference and result in effective 
peration in the field of international peace and security. The second 
                                                
c
prospect of EU membership. This division of labour and the delegation of 
responsibilities of leadership to the EU with full US support suggest that, when the two 
work together, they can undeniably achieve considerable positive results in bringing 
about security and stability. 
 
However, while this is true regarding the Balkans, many other international peace 
and security issues have not been dealt with by the transatlantic allies with the same 
degree of bilateral success. Since Kosovo is in the EU's backyard and has potential 
for future EU membership and it faced a relatively contained conflict, the US was 
prepared to allow the EU to play a larger coordinating role in the region and to 
engage in much greater consultation regarding post-conflict reconstruction efforts. 
Conversely, the Middle East is an issue area where, although the main interests of the 
transatlantic allies, namely the desire for peace and stability, converge, other factors 
remain more influential and thus render bilateral cooperation between the two 
much more complicated. For example, the US and the EC/EU have sought to 
influence and participate in the peace plans for Israel and Palestine s
in
willingness to use military power, the higher level of EU and Middle East economic 
interdependence and proximity, and disagreements over the assessment of threats 
and the appropriate means to deal with them, the EU and the US have frequently 
been in competition rather than convergence regarding the MEPP.25  
 
Based on these two examp
E
bilateral coo
conclusion, which will be demonstrated below, is that such potential for cooperation 
can nevertheless be minimized by other, more influential factors such as issues 
regarding internal EU unity. 
 
(3) EU Unity 
 
 
24 Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States, 
op.cit., pp. 43-44. 
25 P. Marr, "The United States, Europe and the Middle East: Cooperation, Co-optation or 
Confrontation?", in B.A. Roberson, (ed.), The Middle East and Europe: The Power Deficit, 
London, Routledge, 1998, pp. 83-84. 
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The most important consideration to bear in mind concerning internal EU unity in 
relations with the US are that the EU frequently struggles to come up with a single 
position in the face of the different interests of its member states. The dangers of EU 
member state disunity can be brought out in perhaps the clearest way through the 
example of the Iraq war of 2003. As Howorth argues, the question revolved around 
"diametrically opposed approaches to US policy and the transatlantic relationship: 
noisy contestation [by countries such as France] was pitted against over-zealous 
solidarity [of the UK and many of the EU candidate countries at the time]" to the US 
invasion of Iraq.26 Due to such painful disagreements inside the EU, the war in Iraq 
was not only a crisis in the transatlantic relationship, but a damaging split inside the 
EU as well, especially bearing in mind the Union's aspirations towards greater power 
in external affairs.27 In this sense, the position of the EU was undermined in the eyes of 
e US, but more importantly for this discussion, it also meant that the bilateral EU-US 
c k  o f  i n t e r n a l  E U  ex ante strategic 
iscussions on issues such as Iraq undermines the EU's efforts to become a credible 
o the US and complicates the potential outcomes of bilateral 
29
                                                
th
channels of cooperation were effectively shut down, and new ways had to be found 
to deal with the international security issue. The NTA in the lead up to the Iraq war 
was ineffective in helping to bring about a concerted solution to the problem 
because EU-US bilateral cooperation did not exist. 
 
It is only in the post-conflict reconstruction phase that the EU was able to act 
coherently in concrete transatlantic projects, such as the promotion of the reduction 
of Iraq's external debt and improvements to its economy, conceived and run 
through bilateral EU-US dialogues.28 T h e  l a
d
international partner t
EU-US cooperation.  Another consideration is that the US still pursues relationships of 
differentiated importance with individual member states, but a discussion of this 
tendency is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
(4) US Administration 
 
According to several interviewed officials, there is a general sense of continuity 
across administrations in that, for example, even under the first Bush administration 
and the crisis in transatlantic relations resulting from the war in Iraq, the US and the EU 
were nevertheless still working together, particularly at the working group levels.30 
While every administration is important because it places emphasis on different 
 
26 J. Howorth, "France, Britain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis," Survival, vol. 45, no. 4, 2003/04, p. 
188. 
27 Interview with an official (a), DG RELEX, op.cit. 
28 C o u n c i l  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n ,  EU-U.S. Declaration of Support for the People of Iraq, 
10001/04 (Presse 187), Dromoland Castle, 26 June 2004, p. 3. 
29 C. Grant & M. Leonard, "What New Transatlantic Institutions?," Bulletin, issue 41, London, 
CER, April/May 2005, p. 2. 
30 Interview with an official (c), DG RELEX, op.cit. 
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issues, with Obama's willingness to return to the global arena to discuss issues of 'soft' 
security such as climate change, many officials tended to note the greater number 
of similarities rather than differences in the broad policies of each administration. By 
contrast, critics have argued that a change in the US administration can curtail the 
convergence of interests of the EU and the US alongside their potential for 
cooperation. Pollack claims that under the Clinton administration, the EU and US 
terests under the NTA often converged, therefore rendering the transatlantic 
operation in bilateral fora since 
nd begin to work through issues at 
and before they are discussed at the multilateral level. Secondly, the dialogues 
concrete action as an outcome.34 They serve to seek out the areas in which EU-US 
cooperation is feasible.35 As Gardner argues, the NTA has led to the "widening" and 
"deepening" of contacts between EU and US officials, particularly at the lower levels, 
in
relations considerably successful.31 On many issues such as Iraq "the transition from 
Clinton to Bush has indeed shifted the preferences of the US executive from dovish to 
hawkish, making transatlantic agreement more elusive and placing obvious strains 
on the relationship".32 
 
Even so, it appears that, at least regarding EU-US co
the inception of the NTA, in long-term hindsight the change in US administration will 
not prove to have been too significant of a factor. There is little evidence that a 
different US administration would significantly impact EU-US relations in bilateral fora. 
 
Preliminary Conclusion: NTA and Bilateral Dialogues 
 
Based on the evaluation of the four variables and other general trends in EU-US 
bilateral cooperation under the NTA, it can be concluded that bilateral dialogues 
are, firstly, valuable fora because of their open and flexible nature in which both 
sides can express their concerns more freely a
h
under the NTA are limited in terms of their achievements and, while being 
constructive to reinforcing EU-US cooperation in the long term, often represent little 
more than watered-down agreements acceptable to both sides, at least regarding 
international peace and security cooperation.  
 
The value of the bilateral framework, then, indeed rests in the current formalised and 
institutionalised permanent dialogue with a "greater sense of unity and substance" 
than would exist without the NTA.33 The bilateral dialogues are often little more than 
a general discussion about a laundry list of international security issues with little 
                                                 
31 M . A .  P o l l a c k ,  " T h e  N e w  T r a n s a t l a n t i c  A g e n d a  a t  T e n :  R e f l e c t i o n s  o n  a n  E x p e r i m e n t  i n  
al of Common Market Studies, vol. 43, no. 5, 2005, p. 904. 
n, op.cit., pp. 345-346. 
International Governance", Journ
32 Ibid. 
33 Frellese
34 Steffenson, op.cit., p. 40. 
35 Ibid. 
  11 BRIGG Paper 2/2009 
changing the "tone and substance of transatlantic contacts".36 Therefore, the NTA 
"does not replace the need for communication through existing multilateral 
stitutions" such as NATO, but it seeks to "establish a common threshold of 
with more "shape and direction".37 
 a forum is significant because it offers a different type of setting than the 
TA in which the transatlantic partners can meet to discuss issues of international 
fore, the amount of power which the EU 
nd the US possess in the UN in absolute terms and in relation to each other may 
ecific issue. 
                                                
in
cooperation between the EU and the US" 
 
Multilateral Dialogues: United Nations 
 
The UN as
N
security.  
 
(1) Power Balance 
 
In terms of power, the EU as an institution often does not appear to have much 
leverage, particularly regarding issues of international peace and security. While the 
EU is effective in coordinating, for example, post-conflict reconstruction efforts in 
Iraq,38 it was, significantly, unable to present a unified position in the lead-up to the 
war. It would be correct to say, therefore, that the power of the EU at the UN 
depends largely on its ability to present a unified position, as discussed in the next 
section. Even then, this may not always be enough to assure a satisfactory outcome. 
This is determined by the possibility of the EU, even with the US on board, either being 
outvoted in the General Assembly or its proposals in the Security Council being 
vetoed by China or Russia. Similarly, the US proposals, despite the country's less 
volatile position, can also be vetoed in the UNSC, and it seems to enjoy even less 
support in the UNGA than the EU.39 There
a
change depending on the sp
 
(2) Convergence of Interests 
 
As an official at the Commission argues, unless the views and interests of the EU and 
the US happen to totally coincide, as they did, for instance, regarding action in 
Darfur, the UN is not the place for the transatlantic partners to discuss issues of 
international security.40 The reasons for such a reality spring from two very different 
 
tic Declaration to the New Transatlantic Agenda", op.cit., pp. 
olicy and the UN Financial 
nt 
RELEX, European Commission, Brussels, 17 February 2009. 
36 Gardner, "From the Transatlan
97-98. 
37 Steffenson, op.cit., pp. 41-42. 
38 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 161 EC 04 E – Post-Conflict Reconstruction and 
Development: The Challenge in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, pp. 11-12. 
39 M.P. Karns & K.A. Mingst, "The United States as 'Deadbeat'? U.S. P
Crisis", in S. Patrick & S. Forman (eds.), Multilateralism & U.S. Foreign Policy: Ambivale
Engagement, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 282-283. 
40 Interview with an official (b), DG 
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starting points. The EU is dedicated towards promoting "effective multilateralism",41 of 
which the most fundamental part is working through the only universally legitimate 
authority, the UN. The EU will therefore, in principle, be reluctant to engage in any 
action against a sovereign state which is not authorised by the UN. For the US, 
however, the UN is only one forum through which it can achieve its international 
ecurity objectives. A prominent example of such a tendency is its circumvention of 
 
N is thus in a way an opportunity assessment,43 and its willingness to move its interest 
ith the EU to the UN as a setting varies depending on the issue area. 
 seeds of split inside the Union.46 The hardest task 
f all is often developing an EU position in the first place rather than questions of 
                                                
s
the UN regarding the Iraq war in 2003.  
 
On the other hand, the war in Kosovo in 1999 was a case in which transatlantic 
interests did converge. Both the EU countries and the US seemed to realise that their 
involvement was necessary. However, a formal resolution for an intervention against 
Serbia was never taken to the Security Council in the fear that it would be vetoed by 
Russia;42 therefore, the UN was, in effect, circumvented as well. The main difference 
compared to the war in Iraq is that this convergence of interests regarding Kosovo 
was transported to another setting, namely NATO, meaning that the European-US 
cooperation was nonetheless run in a multilateral setting. Therefore, for the US, the
U
convergence w
 
(3)  EU Unity 
 
The section on power balance at the UN concluded that the EU's power varies with 
its ability to present a unified front to the US and to the UN in general. In the UNGA 
the EU is relatively tight as a group both because of Treaty obligations44 and also due 
to a more inherent convergence of positions, except in cases when the US has a 
particularly strong position regarding an issue which goes against the convictions of 
one or more of the member states; this is also true in the UNSC.45 When the US 
presents a 'join or oppose' attitude to its allies, as was the case regarding the war in 
Iraq, this sows particularly damaging
o
cooperation with other countries.47  
 
 
41 C o u n c i l  o f  t h e  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n ,  A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy, 12 December 2003, p. 9. 
42 T. Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 183-185. 
43 D.W. Drezner, "The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion", Perspectives on Politics, vol. 
6, no. 1, 2008, p. 57. 
44 Individual member states, under article 19 of the Treaty on European Union, are obliged to 
coordinate their positions and to keep the non-members of the Security Council fully 
informed. 
45 Interview with an official (b), DG RELEX, op.cit. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Interview with an official (b), European Union, op.cit. 
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On the other hand, a notable nuance of transatlantic cooperation is that the US 
seems not to realize that EU positions in the UN, especially in the UNGA, have been 
converging over the years.48 This is partially a manifestation of the fact that 
"[m]aintaining and expanding the authority of the United Nations remains a key 
priority" for the EU,49 meaning that increasingly EU members choose multilateralism 
wherever possible. The combination of US short-sightedness about such EU priorities 
and a traditional low-level of importance placed on multilateral diplomacy means 
that the US is 'continually' on the defensive in the UN, thereby negatively impacting 
any potential for successful cooperation.50 As Lebl argues, the US does not have a 
trategy of dealing with the EU at the UN and other multilateral institutions, and needs 
er to correct this problem.51 
the US 
hould play in the UN have been sufficiently covered in numerous debates 
 
hangeover from the Clinton to the first Bush administration, which arguably also 
                                                
s
to develop one in ord
 
(4) US Administration 
 
A lack of strategy in approaching the UN may, arguably, be indicative of the overall 
problematic US relationship with the organisation. The history of US relations with the 
UN, including the former's gradual disillusionment with the latter, the impact of the 
different administrations and the more general debate about what role 
s
elsewhere, as have arguments about US unilateralism versus multilateralism.52  
 
A further consideration is the role that the US Congress plays in shaping the overall US 
foreign policy in regard to the UN. As Everts argues, Congress in the 1990s had 
become "increasingly important" in pushing US foreign policy in a more 
confrontational and unilateral direction and had become increasingly sceptical of 
multilateralism.53 On the other hand, he also emphasises the importance of the
c
altered US attitudes towards being more hawkish and unilateralist.54  
 
However, even though it may be true that the Bush administrations were to an extent 
more unilateralist and confrontational and had less regard for the UN than the 
preceding Clinton or the current Obama administrations, several of the interviewees 
 
48 L.S. Lebl, "Advancing U.S. Interests with the European Union", Atlantic Council of the United 
States, Washington D.C., January 2007, p. 46. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., p. 47. 
51 Ibid. 
52 See, for example, D.H. Allin, "Uneasy Triangle: Transatlantic Partnership and UN 
Governance", in H. Gardner & R. Stefanova (eds.), The New Transatlantic Agenda: Facing the 
Challenges of Global Governance, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001, pp. 153-173. 
53 S. Everts, "Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe? Managing Divergence in Transatlantic 
Foreign Policy", London, CER, February 2001, p. 7. 
54 Ibid. 
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stressed the importance of looking at the greater picture of US foreign policy since 
the end of the Cold War rather than concentrating on changes from administration 
to administration.55 Comparably to the findings about the NTA, the emphasis was 
placed on the broad continuities rather than differences. Many of the interviewees 
uggested that it was too early to determine the possible impact of different 
 UN. 
er and often renders it more 
ractical to move outside the UN forum towards fora characterised by stronger 
s which are 
s
administrations on EU-US cooperation in the
 
Preliminary Conclusion: the United Nations 
 
The UN thus appears to be less than successful as a forum in which to pursue EU-US 
cooperation in the field of international peace and security. Transatlantic initiatives 
may be effectively blocked in the UNSC by a veto power, thereby rendering the US 
more willing to act outside of the UN system in the first place. The General Assembly 
has even less capabilities of coming up with tangible initiatives regarding security 
matters. On the Middle East issue, it often offers little more substance than a mere 
collection of speeches.56 The Security Council, on the other hand, offers a very 
intense exchange between Europe and the US with much clearer discussion of what 
both want to achieve.57 However, the EU, on its part, is often unable to present a 
unified position through its permanent members in the Security Council, namely the 
UK and France. This undermines its negotiating pow
p
bilateral transatlantic influences, such as NATO. 
 
Based on the evidence from the three examples, the UN did not prove to be truly 
effective in any of them. Nevertheless, despite the general lack of satisfactory 
outcomes, the UN is a valuable forum for discussion, not only between the 
transatlantic partners, but also with other countries and international actors. Without 
the UN as a forum, the EU and the US would still continue to pursue bilateral 
dialogues. However, the UN allows these dialogues to be transferred onto a higher 
level, where considerations of international legitimacy and collective international 
action trump discussions about merely the capabilities and willingness of two of the 
world's biggest powers to engage in issues which they find important. Even though 
discussions at the UN may not always render results, they are still valuable as a 
normative tool with which to put the position of the US in a global context. The EU 
can also employ the UN in seeking to contain its ally within the framework of 
multilateralism.58 Lastly, the UN is even more valuable for 'soft' global issue
                                                 
55 Please note that it is not possible to provide references to specific interviews in this case 
iew with an official (c), European Union, Brussels, 25 March 2009. 
due to anonymity requests from the interviewees. 
56 Interv
57 Ibid. 
58 Everts, op.cit., p. 10. 
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beyond any one state's reach, such as climate change, poverty and global 
evelopment.59 How does NATO as a forum compare to these findings? 
ing 'EU-US' relations in the NATO framework, as country-to-country mechanisms 
main strong and important. This will be elaborated on under the section on EU 
ues of international security continue to take place as negotiations 
etween the individual members of NATO, not as discussions between the EU and its 
                                                
d
Multilateral Dialogues: NATO 
 
Firstly, it is important to bear in mind that the 'EU' acts even less as a unified actor in 
the NATO setting than it does at the UN. Although it is often the same people who 
discuss strategic political issues in the EU setting and then at NATO,60 the EU has no 
formal coordination mechanisms or requirements for its member states to adopt 
common positions at NATO. Therefore, the term 'EU' must be used with caution when 
discuss
re
unity. 
 
Secondly, NATO is much more focused towards one-dimensional and largely military 
issues than is the UN. Furthermore, if the issue at hand is not a question of 
peacekeeping, as for the example the MEEP, it is automatically excluded from the 
agenda of EU-NATO negotiations because there are no formal arrangements for a 
broader dialogue.61 Therefore, issues such as Afghanistan have to be dealt with 
under sections such as 'any other business', which does not reflect the importance of 
the issue to both of the partners.62 This, again, means that the main discussions about 
crucial iss
b
partners.  
 
(1) Power Balance 
 
At least in theory, NATO is a consensus-based organisation where one country is free 
to block proposed decisions if it does not feel comfortable with them. However, as 
several critics have emphasised, this often is not true in reality since the US remains 
the dominant player in the organisation.63 If a country threatens to block a decision 
which is important to the US, the US can either leave the issue blocked or put 
pressure on that specific country.64 It does so either publicly, for example, through 
speeches criticising the alleged lack of unity in and commitment from some 
members of NATO, or internally, particularly on smaller countries for whom the US is a 
 
 Planning at NATO, "EU-NATO Relations", Bruges, College of 
iew with an official (b), NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 20 March 2009. 
iew with an official (a), NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 20 March 2009. 
59 Interview with an official (c), DG RELEX, op.cit. 
60 J. Shea, Director of Policy
Europe, 15 November 2008. 
61 Interv
62 Ibid. 
63 Lebl, op.cit., p. 34. 
64 Interv
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strategic partner and with whom they wish to keep the best possible relations.65 In 
the last instance, if the issue is especially significant to the US, it can proceed with its 
actions outside of NATO.66 On the one hand, as with the UN, the US "needs partners, 
not only because even superpowers hate to feel lonely, but also because, militarily, 
the United States [arguably] cannot do everything and welcomes the self-generated 
authority and legitimacy of a multilateral operation".67 It therefore "expects 
artnership" and a considerable degree of dedicated burden-sharing in the 
ven in the 
afe territory' of discussions about the Balkans, the EU is unable to come up with a 
egarding Kosovo's declared independence. 
pean allies. Therefore, perhaps it is 
ore appropriate to consider EU unity rather than transatlantic unity as a potentially 
ant factor in the NATO framework. 
p
organisation.68 
 
This means that any talk of the possible equality of power between the EU and the US 
in NATO depends, firstly, on the specific issue at hand and the degree of 
convergence of interests and, secondly, on getting as many EU member states 
together to be able to present a unified position. This rarely happens, for e
's
unified position, for instance, r
 
(2) Convergence of Interests 
 
As has been mentioned before, the convergence of interests between the EU and 
the US at NATO is difficult to discuss because the EU finds it virtually impossible to 
come up with a unified position. Most notably, the war in Iraq in 2003 proved to be 
the case where the interests and views of several EU member states converged far 
more with the US than they did with their Euro
m
more signific
 
(3) EU Unity 
 
As an official at NATO argues, in the recent past there often used to be a block of 
two separate countries with distinct views regarding a particular issue: a European 
one, such as France, and the US.69 Other NATO members associated themselves with 
one side or the other in a process based on their historical experiences and political 
realities as much as short-term considerations.70 Even though this sometimes tended 
to be escalated too much,71 it is indicative of the fact that there can sometimes be 
very little EU unity in NATO, and that particularly the smaller Central and Eastern 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 P. Cornish, Partnership in Crisis: The US, Europe and the Fall and Rise of NATO, London, The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997, p. 89. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Interview with an official (b), NATO Headquarters, op.cit. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
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European countries can, to an extent, find some space in NATO to side with their 
transatlantic ally more freely than is possible in a strictly EU setting. Although one critic 
claims that "European allies sometimes delay a decision in NATO until a common 
osition has already been reached at the EU – thus introducing a de facto EU 
f NATO or indeed the UN framework. The most significant 
onsideration in terms of outcomes therefore remains whether the US can find 
ds to 
e member states' internal disunity, as they tend to downplay the importance of the 
teral discussions with the US and thus create false awareness of 
76
             
p
caucus into NATO deliberations",72 others have emphasised the dangerous rift 
among EU members as a primary source for concern. 
 
For example, Howorth argues that only if the UK and France "make a conscious and 
concerted effort to reconcile their differences will there be any chance of finding 
the ideal profile either for NATO or for ESDP" (European Security and Defense 
Policy).73 Even so, it is less than clear whether enhanced EU unity in NATO would help 
to bring about more effective outcomes of EU-US cooperation. If, theoretically, the 
EU had, through a unified position, blocked the US proposals in the lead-up to the 
Iraq war in 2003, this would have still forced the US to look for other fora and other 
coalitions outside o
c
enough support from European partners rather than whether the EU can present a 
unified front or not. 
 
It is perhaps for this reason that the US arguably tends to place greater importance 
on bilateral dialogues with separate states, sometimes even in the NATO 
framework.74 As Lebl argues, "this approach is inadequate, if not inherently unstable, 
as it undervalues the EU's role"75 and obscures the potential of dialogues through the 
NTA, particularly because the latter could sometimes be much more effective, 
wider-ranging and constructive for future cooperation. The approach also ad
th
EU when pursuing bila
the true weight of the Union in shaping member state policies and capacities.  
 
(4) US Administration 
 
It may be too early to be able to tell whether the US administration is an important 
factor regarding NATO,77 at least since the end of the Cold War. So far, changeovers 
in US administrations seem to be accompanied largely by continuity rather than 
significant ruptures.78 As mentioned above, the US is 'trapped' in the perception of 
                                     
itain and the Euro-Atlantic Crisis", op.cit., p. 186. 
op.cit., p. 16.  
iew with an official (c), NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 20 March 2009. 
72 Lebl, op.cit., p. 28. 
73 Howorth, "France, Br
74 Lebl, 
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Interv
78 Ibid. 
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NATO as one of the most important, if not the most important, frameworks for 
cooperation with its European allies on matters of international security,79 and this 
tendency seems to have remained largely intact throughout the changing US 
administrations. Although, as has been discussed before, US leaders began to attach 
more importance to political and strategic dialogues with the EU even during the 
econd Bush administration, in terms of importance these appear to have been 
manner to dialogues in NATO. It remains to be seen 
t out the other end of the spectrum, where major differences among the 
uropean members effectively paralysed NATO and resulted in action being carried 
illing. It is to ad hoc fora that the paper now 
rns. 
ments, but 
an nevertheless be highly useful in not only engaging sides to a conflict in discussion 
ss, it is useful to look at one example of an ad hoc forum, namely the 
iddle East Quartet, to give some level of indication about how the four variables 
ether there have been any positive outcomes from the 
s
carried through in a parallel 
what the new Obama administration will add to the US relations with NATO. 
 
Preliminary Conclusion: NATO 
 
It can be concluded that NATO is a potentially extremely useful and effective forum 
for cooperation in terms of outcomes, but only if there is a sufficiently strong 
convergence of interests not only across the Atlantic, but also in terms of unity 
among the European allies. This was the case regarding the war in Kosovo, where 
even the member states which were most concerned with gaining international 
legitimacy through the UN were able to put their unease aside and successfully carry 
out a NATO campaign in Serbia and Kosovo. On the other hand, the Iraq war clearly 
brough
E
out through an ad hoc coalition of the w
tu
 
Multilateral Dialogues: ad hoc Fora 
 
Ad hoc fora here are defined as frameworks which have been created in order to 
address a specific issue, usually for the purposes of practicality. Examples of such 
fora, in which both the US and at least several European countries have participated 
are, notably, the Middle East Quartet and the EU 3 + 3 arrangements of talks with 
Iran. Such frameworks are often outside any formal institutional arrange
c
which could not have happened under the auspices of another forum, but also in 
creating selective degrees of multilateralism to address a particular issue. 
 
It would, of course, be imprudent to make generalisations about all types of ad hoc 
fora. Nonethele
M
play out, and wh
deliberations.  
                                                 
79 Lebl, op.cit., p. 35. 
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(1) Power Balance 
 
The most powerful participant in the Middle East Quartet appears to be the US, 
which not only has had a strong interest in the region and very close ties with Israel 
for decades, but which had also 'touted' the Quartet "as a sign of the Bush 
administration's willingness to embrace multilateralism where it could be put to good 
purpose".80 However, the added value of the Quartet has been the fact that it 
somewhat institutionalises the dialogues about the MEPP between the transatlantic 
partners that have been taking place in the UN and other types of fora for years.81 
n the other hand, it is importa t to be O n ar in mind that the US has also pursued 
, with the result of undermining the latter's 
 signing an agreement on movement and access 
pating 
 namely the successful implementation of the 2002 Road Map which 
te a permanent two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.83 It 
onstant, as not only has the 
chieve a considerably high degree of coherence when talking 
, but it is also represented by the Secretary General/High 
tell 
the US administration is an important factor. Based on conjecture from 
previous analysis, it would seem that the Obama administration will be less of a hard-
                                                
unilateral action outside of the Quartet
ctiveness, such as unilaterally effe
to Gaza between representatives of Israel and the Palestinians outside the 
framework of the Quartet in 2005.82  
 
(2) Convergence of Interests 
 
s an obvious convergence of the main interests of all four parties partici There i
in the Quartet,
crea would 
could be maintained that such ad hoc fora are virtually always created because of 
a strong convergence of interests and in order to achieve a specific goal.  
 
(3) EU Unity 
 
U unity can also be interpreted as being virtually a c E
Union been able to a
ddle East about the Mi
Representative (SG/HR) for the CFSP, Javier Solana.84 This means that the EU does 
indeed 'speak with one voice' during the negotiations.  
 
(4) US Administration 
 
inally, since the Quartet was created in 2002, it is still too early to be able to  F
whether 
 
80 Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States, 
op.cit. 
81 Ibid., p. 43. 
82 Interview with an official (c), European Union, op.cit. 
83 Lebl, op.cit., p. 42. 
84 Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States, 
op.cit., p. 44. 
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liner than the Bush administrations have been, but it is likely to keep up its special 
relationship with Israel. Therefore, more continuity than change can be expected. 
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Preliminary Conclusion: Multilateral ad hoc Fora 
 
The Quartet, although valuable as a forum for discussion and a welcome addition to 
ddle East Quartet. 
 
fic case at  the context of   Ad hoc
  use of  ly 
ountabl h ss  
olicy of not holding direct talks with Iran, altho not ey 
automatically bring about immediate, positive or a . 
 
EU and th a h whi  
issues of inter urity. The US, based o ce  ee 
examples, has been more willing to part te a d
whether it had room for manoeu jo reater deg erage 
in, for instance, NATO rather tha ever, the tendency t k to 
ralism is esent, an t  b  
forum, it may   carry out actions outside any institutionalise  To 
some degree, ges in '  l 
pite its frequent convergence of interests with the  s in 
addition a str  in pr ffective eralism, w s its 
hoices of fora. It would be true to argue that the EU would prefer to go through the 
ss, which allows the EU to also engage in a degree of 
rum shopping at the expense of the former in order to promote the latter. 
the other dialogues which take place regarding the Middle East, has not been able 
to successfully address the Israel-Palestinian conflict and implement a long-lasting 
peaceful solution. This is so even despite the more or less balanced power of the EU 
and the US in the forum, the convergence of interests and a high degree of EU unity.  
 
It is not possible, however, to evaluate the usefulness of ad hoc fora in general based 
on the analysis of the variables and outcomes of merely the Mi
However, it is plausible to suggest that the success of such fora depends mainly on
the speci
extremely useful when other
hand and  the ne
dialogues are st
gotiations.
alled beca
 fora can be 
apparent
insurm e obstacles, such as US distrust of t e UN General A
ugh this does 
ny outcomes
embly or its past
 imply that th p
The  e US possess a va
national sec
riety of multilater l fora throug
n the eviden
 in specific 
ch to approach
from the thr
icipa
vre in them, en
n the UN. How
for
ying a g
epending on 
ree of lev
o revert bac
unilate  ever pr
choose to
d if the US feels  hat it is going to e blocked in a
d framework.
 the US enga  'forum shopping on the multilatera level.85 
 
The EU, des US, possesse
ong interest omoting e  multilat hich guide
c
U N  w h e n e v e r  p o s s i b l e  i n  o r d e r  t o  e n j o y  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l e g i t i m a c y .  H o w e v e r ,  a s  a n  
official at the Commission argues, 'effective multilateralism' means that the EU has to 
necessarily try to secure UN approval, but must not remain paralysed if it does not 
receive it.86 In other words, the EU should not become constrained by its dedication 
to multilateralism, as it too recognises that the UNSC is both flawed and outdated 
and hence not always effective.87 Therefore, there is sometimes a fine line between 
multilateralism and effectivene
fo
                                                 
85 R.N. Haass, "Conclusion", in R.N. Haass (ed.), Transatlantic Tensions: The United States, 
Europe, and Problem Countries, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p. 235. 
86 Interview with an official (b), DG RELEX, op.cit. 
87 Ibid. 
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Bilateral versus Multilateral Dialogues: a Comparative Analysis 
 
The table below offers an overview of the trends and importance of the four 
 of that variable in 
pacting the effectiveness and outcomes of EU-US cooperation. 
variables in EU-US cooperation on international security in the different fora, based 
on the preliminary conclusions reached in each section. The first keyword in the first 
sub-cell of each forum (for example, 'largely equal') describes the general trend in, 
or the frequency of, the occurrence of that variable in the forum. The second 
keyword (for example, 'essential') describes the importance
im
 
Table 1: Trends and importance of variables in EU-US cooperation in different fora 
  power balance  convergence of 
interests 
EU unity  US administra-
tion 
largely equal  depends on issue  largely a given, 
can be lowest 
common 
denominator 
continuity rather 
than change 
NTA 
 
essential, but  essential essential 
moderated 
not  significant 
depends on issue 
and EU unity 
depends on issue  depends on 
issue, growing 
convergence 
continuity rather 
than change 
UN 
not essential  essential, but can 
be undermined 
by outvoting or 
veto 
not essential, but 
helpful 
depends on issue 
and other 
factors, not 
essential 
US more 
dominant 
depends on issue  depends on issue  continuity rather 
than change 
NATO 
not essential  not essential, but  not essential, but  not significant 
helpful  helpful 
largely equal  largely a given  largely a given  cannot be 
determined 
Quartet / 
ad hoc fora 
not essential  essential  essential  cannot be 
determined 
 
From this table, it appears that the variable which demonstrated the most 
significance in aiding or hindering EU-US cooperation was the convergence, or lack 
thereof, of transatlantic interests or values. Convergence could be helped by 
greater EU unity, although not in all cases. The balance of power was a less 
significant variable and did not directly result in increased cooperation, except 
perhaps in the bilateral setting. The US administration appears to be the least 
influential variable of the four. 
 
What are the more general findings which can be drawn from this analysis? Firstly, it is 
clear that bilateral dialogues, even ones marked by a significant convergence of 
interests, by themselves are not sufficient to effectively address complex international 
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peace and security issues. EU-US bilateral cooperation in the field can be invaluable 
but has not proven to be adequate by itself.  
 
Equally, multilateral negotiations could still take place without bilateral EU-US 
dialogues; however, this would represent an undesirable step backwards to the pre-
TA era. The second general finding, which has also been noted by several 
an gain useful support, efficiency and a 
egree of legitimacy from good relations at the bilateral level. 
inally, it is fair to argue that the choice of forum and the potential of EU-US 
teral cooperation provides a good base for cooperation at 
e multilateral level, but cannot replace it. Furthermore, bilateral dialogues provide 
discussed and then sent to the multilateral framework to be negotiated at a higher 
                                                
N
interviewees,88 is that multilateral dialogues c
d
 
This leads to the third general finding that ad hoc fora can be valuable additions 
which may complement both existing bilateral as well as multilateral EU-US 
dialogues. This is particularly so bearing in mind that the UN can be a rather 
ineffective forum in which to address 'hard' issues of international security, and that it 
is often circumvented by the world's most powerful global players. Ad hoc fora tend 
to enjoy a high convergence of influence and EU unity, which facilitates their 
functioning and extends their potential for successful outcomes. 
 
F
cooperation often depend on the issue under discussion more than anything else. 
Although there are general trends which help to evaluate the extent to which a 
particular forum can be effective based on, for example, the level of convergence 
of EU-US interests, the final outcomes are likely to vary depending on the context of 
the issue, such as its nature, the global situation, particular circumstances and actors 
involved. Not every international security issue can be discussed in every framework.  
 
The overall conclusion of the paper is, therefore, that bilateral and multilateral 
dialogues are complementary in EU-US cooperation in the field of international 
peace and security. Both types of fora are necessary and cannot be easily 
separated either in their effects on the outcomes of transatlantic cooperation, nor in 
any analysis. Strong bila
th
the added value of continuous and formalised exchanges and negotiations. 
Moreover, a successful outcome of overall EU-US cooperation will probably have 
been fostered in several different frameworks, including discussions through the NTA 
channels. However, based on the findings of the paper, it is not possible to claim that 
the effects on cooperation of bilateral and multilateral fora are interwoven in that 
the bilateral level necessarily acts as a sort of 'clearing house' for issues to be 
 
88 Please note that it is not possible to provide references to specific interviews in this case 
due to anonymity requests from the interviewees. 
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level. While this may certainly happen in some cases, for example in the transatlantic 
economic relations explored by Michael Smith, it does not appear to be a general 
end in the sphere of 'hard' issues of international security. Bilateral and multilateral 
complex threats to security, global and local. It is not surprising, then, 
at the bilateral and multilateral frameworks inevitably touch upon the same issues. 
bedded in the powerful base of a 
ultilateral framework.89 This is not to say that the transatlantic partners are or should 
state's veto would be welcome developments. However, the difficulties of achieving 
tr
fora seem to impact EU-US cooperation in the field of international security in 
parallel, not interwoven ways. 
 
Conclusions: Complementary Dialogues 
 
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that it is more appropriate to view bilateral 
and multilateral interactions as complementary and not readily separable in 
impacting the cooperation between the EU and the US in the field of international 
peace and security. The twenty-first century world is characterised by a wide range 
of increasingly 
th
In one sense, the EU-US bilateral relationship is only one drop in the sea of bilateral 
and regional security dialogues, all of which rest against the backdrop of 
multilateralism as exemplified by the United Nations. 
 
However, the reality remains that the EU and the US are two of the world's most 
capable actors and, when acting in unison, present an impressive force to the rest of 
the world. This force is equipped with military, economic, diplomatic and indeed 
moral tools. Such a duet can often be an invaluable stepping stone towards tackling 
global threats to security, especially when em
m
be always ready or willing to address global peace and security issues worldwide; 
this would be neither feasible nor desirable. Nonetheless, it should be emphasised 
that such transatlantic synergy of interests and capabilities should be strengthened 
and, furthermore, encouraged to remain within the rules of multilateralism. Run this 
way, the transatlantic cooperation has the potential to be an invaluable part of the 
global security toolbox. 
 
In an ideal situation, the EU and the US would have at their disposal a reformed set of 
tools with which to approach issues of international peace and security. A more 
effective UN or a wieldier NATO which could not be paralysed by a single member 
such degrees of reform are well-known and are bound to require some time and a 
high degree of commitment from NATO and UNSC members if they are to ever 
                                                 
89 J.M.D. Barroso, "A Letter from Brussels to the Next President of the United States of America", 
Delegation of the European Commission to the USA website, 24 September 2008, p. 4. 
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manifest themselves. In the face of such long-term constraints, what are the more 
iate and more feasible options? 
fferent 
 to engage in international diplomacy" and that 
ate to deal with an 
 US to reform multilateral fora 
antial document outlining the strengths and weaknesses of EU cooperation with 
ework for EU-US interaction if appropriate changes 
r to render both bilateral and multilateral transatlantic 
ty are 
immed
 
Firstly, the transatlantic partners should make more frequent and better use of ad 
hoc fora such as the Middle East Quartet. Ad hoc fora are particularly valuable 
because of their flexible nature, tailor-designed for the complexities of di
issues. Furthermore, as several observers have argued, it seems that "the EU's smaller 
countries and non-participant institutions increasingly seem to accept such forums as 
useful, pragmatic ways for the Union
they are supported "almost instinctively" by the US.90 The greater use of these fora in 
the future would mean that the transatlantic partners could pool their resources, 
material and diplomatic, into designing formats most appropri
issue at hand. 
 
Secondly, although the potential for the EU and the
such as the UN is limited due to reasons mentioned above, they are, nevertheless, in 
a position to reform their bilateral interactions by reforming the NTA. The European 
Commission has already undergone an independent review which resulted in a 
subst
the US through the NTA.91 The chief finding of the review was that the NTA should be 
"revamped and relaunched" instead of being discarded, meaning that it can 
continue to serve as a useful fram
are made to its format and strategic purpose.92 
 
Finally, secondary factors like fostering EU unity could be addressed more 
productively in orde
exchanges more effective. As discussed in the analysis, variables such as EU uni
often an important factor in producing more successful outcomes in both types of 
fora. Therefore, the EU should concentrate on developing a more coherent foreign 
policy, on which a "viable transatlantic relationship" is currently dependent.93 As 
Vernet argues, "ne vous demandez pas ce que les Etats-Unis peuvent faire pour 
l'Europe, demandez-vous ce que l'Europe peut faire pour les Etats-Unis".94 Although 
the opposite is also true, perhaps it is time for the EU to demonstrate to the US that it 
too is a capable actor and partner in the realm of international peace and security.  
                                                 
90 Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the United States, 
93 Grant & Leonard, op.cit., p. 2. 
94 D. Vernet, "Les Européens proposent un partenariat d'égal à égal au prochain président 
des Etats-Unis", Le Monde, 4 November 2008, p. 1 
op.cit., p. 43. 
91 Please see Review of the Framework for Relations between the European Union and the 
United States, op.cit. for the full text. 
92 Ibid., p. 5. 
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